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CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW DISQUALIFIES
TENANT AS HOUSING COMMISSIONER
The concern that an otherwise honorable person could be tempted to
reap private benefits from public service' underlies conflict-of-interest
laws. 2 Strictly applied, conflict-of-interest laws have the effect of
voiding any decision3 or contract 4 where any potential for personal
1. "An impairment of impartial judgment can occur in even the most well-meaning
men when their personal economic interests are affected by the business they transact on
behalf of the government." United States v. Mississippi Valley Co., 364 U.S. 520, 549
(1961). See Aldon v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495, 502, 127 A.2d 190, 194
(App. Div. 1956); Smith v. City of Albany, 61 N.Y. 444, 446 (1875). See also Manning,
The Purity Potlach: An Essay on Conflict of Interest, American Government, and Moral
Escalation, 24 FED. B.J. 239 (1964).
2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1970). This provision prescribes criminal penalties for
persons who participate personally and substantially as a government officer or employ-
ee in proceedings that "to his knowledge, he, his spouse, minor child, partner, organiza-
tion in which he is serving as officer, director, trustee, partner or employee, or any
person or organization with whom he is negotiating or has any arrangement concerning
prospective employment, has a financial interest." Id. § 208(a). See United States v.
Mississippi Valley Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961) (contract in which an unpaid government
consultant provided financial information about an atomic energy project to an invest-
ment banking firm for which he was an active officer was voided); United States v.
Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910) (criminal conviction of army captain who colluded with
contractors for river and harbor improvements in Savannah, Georgia was upheld).
State and local governments have also enacted conflict-of-interest laws. See, e.g.,
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268A, § 23(d) (Michie Law. Co-op 1968) (no state, county, or
municipal officer or employee shall "use or attempt to use his official position to secure
unwarranted privileges or exemptions for himself or others or give the appearance of
such action"); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1090 (Deering 1973) (high-level government officials
required to disclose economic interests). Cf. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr CANON
5(c)(1), (2) (1972) (judges should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to
reflect adversely on their impartiality). See generally Note, Conflict of Interests: State
Government Employees, 47 VA. L. REV. 1034 (1961); 70 W. VA. L. REV. 400,401 (1968).
For a review of conflict-of-interest provisions applying to municipal employees, see
Freilich & Larson, Conflict of Interest: A Model Statutory Proposal for the Regulation of
Municipal Transactions, 38 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV. 373 (1970); Kaplan & Lillich, Munici-
pal Conflict of Interest: Inconsistencies and Patchwork Prohibitions, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
157 (1958); Note, The Doctrine of Conflict of Interests Applied to Municipal Officials in
New Jersey, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 582 (1958); Note, Conflict-of-Interests of Government
Personnel: An Appraisal of the Philadelphia Situation, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1959); 20
BUFFALO L. REV. 487 (1971).
3. See, e.g., Wilson v. Iowa City, 165 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1969) (voiding decision of
city council relating to urban renewal project where members had property interests
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benefit to the public official exists. However, a trend toward limiting
the scope of disqualifying interests and requiring disclosure of holdings
as a prerequisite to assuming public office has evolved. 5 Nevertheless,
many courts continue to rely on the traditional inclusive conflict of
interest approach. As a result many persons whose interests and input
could provide positive benefits to governmental decision-making have
been precluded from public office. 6
In Brown v. Kirk,7 the Illinois Supreme Court held that Illinois'
conflict-of-interest statutes8 disqualified public housing tenants from
within project area); Griggs v. Borough of Princeton, 33 N.J. 207, 162 A.2d 862 (1960)
(voiding decision of borough council because two members were employed by univer-
sity, which held controlling interest in municipal improvement corporation).
4. See, e.g., Ganntt v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 189 Ark. 449, 74 S.W.2d 232
(1934) (voiding contract with waterworks district in which commissioners were also
stockholders of contracting company); Norrell v. Judd, 374 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1963) (voiding contract for cable television connections to public housing sites
where housing director was also director of contracting company); Conley v. Town of
Ipswitch, 352 Mass. 201, 224 N.E.2d 411 (1967) (finding illegal "contract" where drug-
gist, a town selectman, recovered cost of drugs dispensed to welfare recipients directly
from the city welfare office).
5. The transition toward disclosure type statutes reflects the economic changes in and
the growing complexity of society, and the fact that many situations present fewer
dangers of real conflict. Note, Conflict of Interests: State Government Employees, 47
VA. L. REV. 1034, 1056-57 (1961); 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 675, 680 (1966). In general, the
official must disclose only those interests which could be materially affected by his
service. However, some recent statutes require general disclosure of financial and
property interests. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1090 (Deering 1973). These general
disclosure statutes raise potential constitutional issues and may inhibit potential public
officers from submitting to such openness regarding their business affairs. See generally
Pares & Smith, California's Governmental Conflict of Interests Act: The Public Interest
v. The Right to Privacy, 49 L.A.B. BULL. 321 (1974); Note, Fighting Conflict of Interests
in Officialdom: Constitutional and Practical Guidelines for State Financial Disclosure
Laws, 73 MICH. L. REV. 758 (1975).
6. See Atherton v. City of Concord, 109 N.H. 164, 245 A.2d 387 (1968). "[I]f every
possibility of conflict, no matter how remote, uncertain, contingent, insubstantial or
specific, were cause for disqualification, many persons who are. . . suited for office by
the very reason of their commercial or professional experience would be prevented from
contributing their services to the community." Id. at 165-66, 245 A.2d at 389. See also
Manning, The Purity Potlach: An Essay on Conflict of Interest, American Government,
and Moral Escalation, 24 FED. B.J. 239 (1964); McElwain & Vorenberg, The Federal
Conflict of Interest Statutes, 65 HARV. L. REV. 955 (1952).
7. 64 Ill. 2d 144, 355 N.E.2d 12 (1976).
8. The court relied upon both the specific conflict-of-interest provision pertaining
to housing authority commissioners, The Housing Authorities Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
67-1/2, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1975), and the state's general provision, The Corrupt Practices
Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 3 (Smith-Hurd 1975), to disqualify the tenants. The
Housing Authorities Act prohibits any direct or indirect interest in any project. For those
interests acquired before the appointment, disclosure is required. The Corrupt Practices
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serving as commissioners of a local housing authority. The suit was
initiated by tenants of the East St. Louis Housing Authority who were
appointed commissioners by the Mayor, but subsequently declared
ineligible by the State Director of Local Government Affairs. 9 The
supreme court, reversing the appellate court, 0 found that the tenants'
leases were contractual interests with the housing authority. The court
concluded that due to this contractual relationship, the potential for
personal gain derived from the tenant's role as commissioner created a
conflict-of-interest within the scope of the statutes."
Conflict-of-interest theory is based on the common law principle
that a person in a fiduciary position cannot faithfully serve both his
own interests and the public trust simultaneously.12 Concerned with
high moral standards, the common law rule applied regardless of the
good faith of the individual involved, 3 since even the appearance of a
Act, on the other hand, prohibits interests in "any contract or the performance of any
work in the making or letting of which such officer may be called on to act or vote." Id.
9. The plaintiffs were four tenants of the East St. Louis Public Housing Authority
who sought declaratory relief for themselves and all other existing and future tenants
that the state conflict-of-interest statutes did not preclude low income housing tenants
from serving as commissioners. 33 Il. App. 2d 477, 342 N.E.2d 137 (1973).
The plaintiffs named the Director of State Department of Local Government Affairs
as defendant. The Director is empowered to certify and approve the appointments to
local housing authorities. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67-1/2, § 3 (Smith-Hurd 1975). The
Director refused to approve the local appointments based on an advisory opinion of the
Illinois Attorney General.
The Illinois Attorney General's opinion defined "interest" according to Webster's
New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1953), as a "right, title, share or participation in a
thing," and found that the tenant's lease would be a "share or participation in the
housing project." 1973 ILL. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 612 (1973).
10. 33 I11. App. 2d 477, 342 N.E.2d 137 (1973).
II. 64 111. 2d at 148-49, 355 N.E.2d at 14-15.
12. The principle is derived from the common law concept of the duty of loyalty
which a trustee owes to the interests of the cestui que trust. When the trustee must act
for another, the trustee is prohibited from benefiting himself from this representation
since one cannot serve two masters at the same time or act satisfactorily when faced with
conflicting interests. See 3 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 54 (1946);
Scowr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 495-505 (3d ed. 1967).
In government service, an officer is held to owe a constructive duty to the public at
large as the cestui que trust. See Terry v. Bender, 143 Cal. App. 2d 198, 300 P.2d 119
(1956). "A public office is a public trust created in the interest and for the benefit of the
people. Public officers are obligated, virtute officii, to discharge their responsibilities
with integrity and fidelity. Since the officers of a governmental body are trustees of the
public, they may not exploit or prostitute their official position for their private benefit."
Id. at 206-07, 300 P.2d at 125.
13. The purpose behind this rule is to remove the possibility for self-dealing by
precluding the individual from weighing his own interest along with those of the public;
1977]
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conflict could undermine public confidence in governmental deci-
sions. 1 4
Most jurisdictions have recognized the need for reasonable limita-
tions on the private conduct of public servants and have adopted
statutes which define permissible activity. Recognizing that the inter-
ests may be direct or indirect,15 most jurisdictions require that the
benefits be personal and pecuniary, 6 though advantages to one's fami-
in a sense to protect the officer from succumbing to his own human frailties. See, e.g.,
Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn. 1, 60 A.2d 774 (1951). See note I supra.
An extreme example of a court's interpretation of this principle is found in People ex
rel. Schenectady Illuminating Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 166 App. Div. 758, 151
N.Y.S. 1012 (1915). There it was found that the sale of $7.44 worth of lamps was
disqualified because an official who owned one share in the company retained an interest
derived from a general concern with the company's prosperity. Id. at 768, 151 N.Y.S. at
1014.
Any situation where the potential for self-dealing arises can invoke the conflict-of-
interest rule, regardless of evidence of good faith or good judgment. See Price v.
Edmonds, 337 S.W.2d 658 (Ark. 1960); Norrell v. Judd, 374 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. Ct. App.
1964). See also 10 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.97 (3d ed. 1966); Kaplan
& Lillich, Municipal Conflicts of Interest: Inconsistencies and Patchwork Prohibitions,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 181 (1958).
14. See Board of Selectmen v. Linder, 352 Mass. 581, 227 N.E.2d 359 (1967). In
Linder, the defendant was a member of the town board who agreed to serve as a paid
correspondent to a local newspaper. The court found that to serve in both positions
simultaneously would violate the state conflict-of-interest law since its purpose "was
as much to prevent giving the appearance of conflict as to suppress all tendency to
wrongdoing." Id. at 583, 227 N.E.2d at 360. Cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, CANON 9 (1971) (A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety). See also notes 15-21 and accompanying text infra.
15. See Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal. 2d 565, 375 P.2d 289, 25 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1962)
(official's ownership of more than 3% of stock in plumbing company contracting with
city held to constitute conflict); S & L Assocs. v. Township of Wash., 61 N.J. Super.
312, 160 A.2d 635 (App. Div. 1960) (town planning commissioners' ownership of proper-
ty in areas which they zoned for industry constituted conflict). See generally Kaplan &
Lillich, Municipal Conflicts of Interest: Inconsistencies and Patchwork Prohibitions, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 157, (1958); Kennedy & Beck, Interest of Public Officers in Contracts
Prohibited by Law, 28 S. CALIF. L. REV. 335, 339 (1955).
16. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW art. 23, § 800(3) (McKinney 1974). An "interest"
is defined as " direct or indirect pecuniary or material benefit accruing to a municipal
officer or employee as the result of a contract with the municipality which such officer or
employee serves." Id. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.13 (West Supp. 1976). Criminal
penalties are provided for public officers or employees who, in their public capacity,
negotiate or bid for a contract in which they have a private pecuniary interest, direct or
indirect. Id. § 946.13(I)(a). See also Panozzo v. City of Rockford, 306 11. App. 443, 28
N.E.2d 748 (1940) (debtor or relative of official not sufficient to invoke conflict-of-
interest law); Marsh v. Town of Hanover, 113 N.H. 667, 313 A.2d 411 (operation of
private ambulance service by city fireman would be conflict-of-interest only if it com-
petes for business with public ambulance system); Mumma v. Town of Brewster, 174
Wash. 112, 24 P.2d 438 (1933) (interest must be financial, not based on sentiment alone).
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ly, 17 to proprietary interests, 18 and sometimes to one's employer 19 may
invoke the law. Other states apply a more inclusive standard which
provides that any personal benefit that could influence a public deci-
sion is prohibited. 20
In recent years, some states have adopted "remote interest" stat-
utes2 which define the quantity of interests, mostly financial, below
which it is presumed to be of such inconsequential value that an
official will not be swayed in the execution of his duties. 22 These laws
require either partial or full disclosure of financial and property inter-
ests by the prospective member to the governing body.23 Once an
official has disclosed his holdings, the issue of whether these interests
should bar participation is dependent on the facts of the particular
case.
24
17. See Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn. 1, 60 A.2d 774 (1948); Githens v. Butler
Co., 350 Mo. 295, 165 S.W.2d 650 (1942). Cf. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW art. 23, § 800(3)
(McKinney 1974) (employee deemed to have interest in contracts of his spouse, minor
children and dependents).
In Githens, the Missouri court voided the sale of land to the wife of a county judge.
The court reasoned that the husband's legal duty to support his wife and his entitlement
to his wife's real estate were disqualifying pecuniary interests even though they were
indirect. 350 Mo. at 299, 165 S.W.2d at 652.
18. See, e.g., Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal. 2d 565, 375 P.2d 289, 25 Cal. Rptr. 441
(1962) (conflict exists where city official owned stock in plumbing company contracting
with city); Laconia Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Emanuel, 281 A.2d 159 (N.H. 1971) (no
conflicting interest when attorney representing corporate developer carrying out rede-
velopment project divested interests and took no official action on matter when elected
mayor of city). See also N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW art. 23, § 800 (McKinney 1974).
19. See, e.g., Griggs v. Borough of Princeton, 33 N.J. 207, 162 A.2d 862 (1960)
(decisions designating university owned land as renewal area when made by employees
of university serving on planning board were voided); cf. Wilson v. City of Long Branch,
27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837 (1958) (mayor who was director and stockholder of bank
owning some mortgages in area designated as blighted was not disqualified from voting
on resolution). Contra, Adair v. Nashville Hous. Auth., 388 F.Supp. 481 (D.C. Tenn.
1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1976).
20. See, e.g., Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal. 2d 565, 375 P.2d 289, 25 Cal. Rptr. 441
(1962); Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn. 1, 60 A.2d 774 (1948); Emwags v. Reading
Parking Auth., 385 Pa. 592, 124 A.2d 92 (1956).
21. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.88 (West 1976); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW art. 23, § 802
(McKinney 1974). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1091(b)(1)-(9) (Deering 1973); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 42.1112 (West 1965).
22. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.88(8) (West 1976) (This provision excludes
interests in contracts for goods or services of less than $1,000 and the when contracting
governmental unit has a population of less than 5,000.); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW art. 23, §
802(2)(f) (McKinney 1974) (This provision relates to contracts which exceed $100 only
and additionally provides that ownership of less than 5% of the outstanding stock shall
not void a contract between the government and the corporation. Id. § 802(2)(a)).
23. See note 5 supra. See also 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 641 (1974).
24. See, e.g., S & LAssocs. v. Township of Wash., 61 N.J. Super. 312, 160A.2d 635
(App. Div. 1960) (conflict-of-interest found where members of town planning commis-
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State courts have used remote interest, disclosure type conflict-of-
interest provisions, similar to that in the Illinois Housing Authorities
Act,25 to void contracts or decisions, but have rarely reached the issue
of an official's qualifications to serve as housing commissioner. In
Norrell v. Judd,26 the Kentucky Court of Appeals nullified a contract
made by the director of a local housing authority with a company that
he simultaneously served as director. The court refused to order re-
moval from office absent a self-executing provision in the statute.27
Similar decisions have been reached by the Iowa28 and Kansas29 Su-
preme Courts. In a California case involving alleged conflict-of-inter-
sion owned land in area zoned industrial at the time of determination to exclude
plaintiff's land from industrial classification).
The test for conflicting activity while in office is whether the officer or employee
participated in the making of the contract in his official capacity. Stigall v. City of Taft,
58 Cal. 2d 565, 375 P.2d 289, 25 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1962). In Adair v. Nashville Hous.
Auth., 388 F. Supp. 481 (D.C. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1976), a challenge to decisions of the Nashville, Tennessee
Housing Authority included claims of conspiracy and conflict-of-interests on the part of
bank and university employees participating as commissioners in decisions affecting
property interests of their employers. The district court found that the lack of personal
pecuniary benefit or showing of private favoritism by these commissioners were suffi-
cient to dispose of these claims. Id. at 489. The court found "no evidence that the
officials were, in their public capacities, at any time motivated by any purpose other than
serving the interests of the community." Id.
25. See note 8 supra.
26. 374 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963).
27. Id. at 194. In Norrell, the court found the defendant's conduct relevant only to
whether the contract should be voided rather than toward any sanctions against the
permissibility of his actions. Without a self-executing provision which would automat-
ically declare the office vacant upon a finding of conflict, the court refrained from
determining the issue of defendant's competence to serve. Id. See Ky. REV. STAT. §
80.080 (1970).
28. Wilson v. Iowa City, 165 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1969). In Wilson, the court voided the
decision of the Iowa City Council declaring certain areas eligible for federal urban
renewal funds. Rather than disqualifying the votes of interested councilmen, the court
concluded that the state urban renewal conflict-of-interest provision, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 403.16 (West 1973), required more inclusive application. The court reasoned that
the statute prevented these public officials not only from gaining personal advantage
after they knew what was to be included within the blighted area, but also to prevent
them from "trading upon advance information." 165 N.W.2d at 820. This decision
prompted the Iowa legislature to enact a "crucial vote" statute which provided for
voiding a vote only where the vote of the members with conflicting interest is crucial to
the outcome. IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.16 (West Supp. 1976). See also Note, Remedies For
Conflict of Interest Among Public Officers in Iowa, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 600, (1973).
29. Anderson v. City of Parsons, 209 Kan. 337, 496 P.2d 1333 (1972) (limited the
scope of disqualifying interests to cases where the voting officer has an interest in
property in the specific project area selected).
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est by the director of a redevelopment agency owning substantial
property in the project area, the court upheld dismissal of the con-
flict-of-interest claim because the official neither acquired new inter-
ests during his service, nor failed to disclose his existing interests. 3
The Connecticut Supreme Court in Housing Authority v. Dorsey31
resolved the issue of the eligibility of tenants as housing commission-
ers.32 The court applied an inclusive common law standard to bar
tenants from serving in situations where private interest could interfere
with public duty.33 The Dorsey court found that the temptation of being
able to select tenants, to determine rents, personnel policies, and rules
governing the rights of tenants,34 would always place the tenant com-
missioner in a position to weigh personal interests in matters before the
authority.35
30. In re Dev. Plan for Bunker Hill, 61 Cal. 2d 21, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 389 P.2d 538
(1964). In this case, the conflict-of-interest statute was similar to the Illinois provision
relied upon by the court in Brown v. Kirk. See note 8 supra. Nonetheless, the California
court chose not to nullify any decisions. The court found adequate safeguards in the
disclosure provision for the chairman of the redevelopment agency's preexisting own-
ership of 14 parcels of property in the project area. Id. at 66-67, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 103,389
P.2d at 567.
31. 164 Conn. 247, 320 A.2d 820, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1043 (1973).
32. While Dorsey is the only case on point, several state attorney generals have
prepared advisory opinions on the issue of tenants' eligibility to serve as housing
authority commissioners. For example, the Florida Attorney General interpreted a
disclosure-type, conflict-of-interest provision, FLA. STAT. § 421.06 (1973), as not being in
itself a disqualifying factor for appointment to the commission. Op. Fla. Att'y Gen. No.
073-96 (1973). He interpreted the housing authority conflict-of-interest provisions as
applying to pecuniary interests. Specifically, the purpose was to prevent an official with
inside information from gaining personal advantages from his position and to reap a
profit to the detriment of the public. Id.
The Ohio Attorney General found no conflict-of-interest for a tenant commissioner
so long as the tenant pays rent in accordance with the contractual formula. OP. OHIO
Arr'y GEN. No. 71-057 (1971). The opinion found that the intention of the provision
barring commissioners from acquiring interests, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3735.29 (Page
1971), related to "devices under which the member or employee may profit by reason of
his position." Id.
The New York Attorney General also found no conflict of interest so long as the
tenant disclosed the existence of this lease. The opinion concluded, however, that the
tenant could not renew his lease during the term of office since this would constitute the
acquisition of an interest. Op. N.Y. ATr'y GEN. 95 (1967). See Centazzo v. Canna, 110
R.I. 507, 293 A.2d 904 (1972). But see OP. ILL. ATr'Y GEN. No. 612 (1973); Op. Mo.
Arr'y GEN. No. 69-78 (1969); 1 Pov. L. Rpm. (CCH) 2720.79 (Dec. 19, 1968) (N.C.
Attorney General opinion).
33. 164 Conn. at 251, 320 A.2d at 822. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
34. Id. at 252-53, 320 A.2d at 823.
35. Id. at 251,320 A.2d at 822. The Dorsey court applied an inclusive standard similar
to the provision utilized in Low v. Madison. 135 Conn.1, 60 A.2d 774 (1948). See note 17
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The Illinois Supreme Court found the rationale of the Dorsey case
controlling in Brown v. Kirk.36 The court found that the conflict-of-
interest provision in the Housing Authorities Act embodied the inclu-
sive common law standard and therefore the provision was designed to
prevent the creation of any potential temptation or abuse.37
The supreme court disagreed with the analysis of the appellate
court.38 Recognizing that the Housing Authorities Act has both a dis-
closure provision which applies to pre-existing interests and an inclu-
sive common law provision prohibiting any acquisition of interests
after taking office, the court found that the leases were continuing
contractual relations which were encompassed by the latter provi-
sion.39 Second, the court found that the Illinois general conflict-of-
interest statute, 40 was relevant to any potential relationships where
potential personal gain existed and should not be limited to business
relationships of the housing authority.41
The reliance on the inclusive standard by the supreme court is
inconsistent with rulings of other Illinois courts which held that the
supra. As a result, the tenant is removed from all situations where his private interest
could potentially conflict with the public duty.
36. 64 I11. 2d 144, 148, 355 N.E.2d 12, 14 (1976).
37. Id.
38. The appellate court found that plaintiffs were not persons with direct or indirect
property interests in the housing authority. The court found that the absence of language
indicating eligibility standards in the housing authority's conflict-of-interest provision
indicated a legislative intent to allow the appointment of interested commissioners so
long as they disclosed those interests. 33 Ill. App. 2d 477, 481, 342 N.E.2d 137, 140
(1973). Furthermore, while the statute contained an absolute prohibition against acquir-
ing any new interests while in office, disclosure of preexisting interests was statutorily
mandated. Id. Similarly, the appellate court found the Corrupt Practices Act to pertain
only to interests derived from the letting of contracts for the performance of services to
the housing authority. Id. at 482, 342 N.E.2d at 141. To reach these conclusions, the
court applied the general rule of statutory construction which provides for strict con-
struction where disqualification is at issue. Id. at 483,342 N.E.2d at 142. See generally J.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION (1943).
39. 64 Il. 2d at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 14. The court was able to reach this result because
it found that the tenant's lease would exist both before and after the tenant would
assume his duties as commissioner. This conclusion is debatable in two ways. First, it
relies on the time element while ignoring the purpose of the disclosure requirement in the
Housing Authorities Act. If the purpose of disclosure is to expose one's interest before
assuming office, the public record will reveal actual conflicts rather than precluding a
citizen from serving the public because of a potential for conflict-of-interest. Second,
the characterization of a lease as a continuing interest seems contrary to the contract
theory that once a contract is executed, the legal rights and responsibilities of the parties
are fixed.
40. See note 8 supra.
41. 64 Ill. 2d at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 14.
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conflicting interest must be certain and definable, and of a pecuniary
or proprietary nature.4 2 In contrast to the findings of the supreme
court, the intermediate court found that the relevant statutes were
directed toward the personal gain the official might obtain by voting in
favor of a particular contracting party.43 The tenant commissioner
could then exercise the same prerogative of self-disqualification on
issues involving personal financial interests that is available to other
public officers with contractual or property interests. If the supreme
court had chosen to apply this test rather than the more inclusive
personal interest standard, the tenant, as commissioner, could remain
eligible to vote on a range of matters that do not affect his financial
interest in the housing authority.
The supreme court's revival of common law standards for conflict-
of-interest44 seems to be an unduly harsh remedy. Disclosure of the
leasehold interest and compliance with civil and criminal laws affecting
conduct of public officers would subject the tenant commissioner to
the same safeguards against unfair promotion of self-interest that
apply to other members of the local housing authority. In addition,
tenant appointments promote both the policy objective of encouraging
participation of lower-income persons in programs designed to assist
them,45 and political efforts of tenant organizations to gain access
to management decision-making. 46 To prevent public housing residents
42. See People v. Sperry, 314 Ill. 205, 145 N.E. 344 (1924) (official received monthly
salary from company contracting with city); People v. Saviano, 31 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 335
N.E.2d 553 (1975) (criminal conflict-of-interests where defendant who was member of
forest preserve commission owned land sought by the commission); Kruse v. Stream-
wood Utilities Corp., 34 Ill. App. 2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731 (1962) (official's ownership of
stock in sewer and water company seeking franchise from city); Town of Peoria v.
Rauschkolb, 333 Ill. App. 441, 78 N.E.2d 123 (1948) (supervisor and overseer of poor
received 10% commission on drug purchases by city); Panozzo v. City of Rockford, 306
Ill. App. 443, 28 N.E.2d 748 (1948) (financial interest in city garbage collection con-
tracts). See also Spak & Parenti, Conflict of Interest: A Totally Ignored Illinois Criminal
Sanction Against Corruption in Government, 52 Ci.-KENT L. REV. 64 (1975).
43. 33 I1. App. 2d at 483, 342 N.E.2d at 141-42.
44. See notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
45. See Hirshen & LeGates, Neglected Dimensions in Low-Income Housing and
Development Programs, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 3, 15 (1975); Kline & LeGates, Citizen
Participation in the Model Cities Program: Toward a Theory of Collective Bargaining for
the Poor, I BLACK L.J. 44, 46 (1971).
46. See, e.g., S. BURGHARDT, TENANTS AND THE URBAN CRISIS (1972); Hirshen &
Brown, Public Housing's Neglected Resource: The Tenants, 6 Crr, at 15 (1972); Hirshen
& LeGates, Neglected Dimensions in Low-Income Housing and Development Programs,
9 URBAN L. ANN. 3, 15 (1975); Lefcoe, HUD's Authority to Mandate Tenants'Rights in
Public Housing, 80 YALE L.J. 463 (1971). See also Johnson, Collective Tenant Action:
Should the Rent Strike be Institutionalized, 46 L.A.B.J. 138 (1971). See generally M.
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from serving on a public body affecting their vital interests, while
allowing wealthier persons representing banking, real estate and other
interests to continue as commissioners, permits a rigid rule to conquer
basic equity and policy concerns.
However, the resolution of this matter by the Illinois Supreme Court
need not impair the legislature from clarifying the purposes of its
conflict-of-interest statutes. Several states, 47 including Connecticut, 48
have revised their applicable provisions to exclude a tenant's lease
from those interests which a commissioner of a housing authority may
own or acquire. The California legislature has taken a further step by
requiring at least two tenant commissioners to serve on its local hous-
ing authorities. 49 Congress has also responded by adding a policy to the
federal public housing statute that no person should be barred from
serving on the governing body of a housing agency because of his
tenancy in a low-rent housing project.50 Although public housing re-
mains a primary concern of state governments, national and local5'
efforts to encourage tenant participation could focus on the state
legislative process to reform the enabling laws for public housing
authorities. A statutory declaration that tenants can serve as commis-
sioners when they disclose their interests would then create a balance
between the positive benefits of tenant representation in public hous-
ing decisions and the potential abuses of self-dealing.
Jonathan M. Davidson
LIPSKY, PROTEST IN CITY POLITICS: RENT STRIKES, HOUSING, AND POWER OF THE POOR
(1970).
47. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 97, § 2 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 456.115 (1975).
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8042 (West 1975). The Connecticut statute was revised
after the Dorsey decision to provide that "[o]ccupancy of a dwelling unit owned by the
housing authority. . . shall not be deemed an interest in any project or in a contract for
materials or services or in property included in any project for the purposes of this
section." Id.
49. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34270 (Deering Supp. 1976).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. 1975). "No person should be barred from serving on the
board of directors or similar governing body of a local public housing agency because of
his tenancy in a low-rent housing project." This policy statement was added to the
federal public housing statute in response to state rulings barring tenants from participa-
tion on governing boards of housing authorities. See generally Lefcoe, HUD's Authority
To Mandate Tenants' Rights in Public Housing, 80 YALE L.J. 463 (1971).
51. See, e.g., Baron, St. Louis Tenant Management Corporations, 31 J. HousING 263
(1974); Beckham, Tenant Responsibility: Boston Provides Showcase as Tenants Assume
Leading Roles, 30 J. HouSING 76 (1973). See also Hartman & Carr, Housing Authorities
Reconsidered, 35 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 10 (1969).
[Vol. 14:273
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol14/iss1/13
